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Cicero, De Oratore

-   Book 3 , 82-170


Translated by J.S.Watson (1860), with some minor alterations. Click on the L symbols to go to the Latin text of each section. Click on ** to go to the translator's footnotes.


Previous sections (1-81)

{22.} [82] L   Catulus then said, "It is, indeed, by no means astonishing, Crassus, that there should appear in you either such energy, or such agreeableness, or such copiousness of language; though I previously supposed that it was merely from the force of natural genius that you spoke in such a way as to seem to me not only the greatest of orators, but the wisest of men; but I now understand that you have always given precedence to matters relating to philosophy, and your copious stream of eloquence has flowed from that source; and yet, when I recollect the different stages of your life, and when I consider your manner of living and pursuits, I can neither conceive at what time you acquired that learning, nor can I imagine you to be strongly addicted to those studies, or men, or writings; nor can I determine at which of these two things I ought most to feel surprised, that you could obtain a thorough knowledge of those matters which you persuade me are of the utmost assistance to oratory, amid such important occupations as yours, or that, if you could not do so, you can speak with such effect." [83] Here Crassus replied, 'I would have you first of all, Catulus, persuade yourself of this, that, when I speak of an orator, I speak not much otherwise than I should do if I had to speak of an, actor; for I should say that he could not possibly give satisfaction in his gesture unless he had learned the exercises of the palaestra, and dancing; nor would it be necessary that, when I said this, I should be myself a performer, though it perhaps would be necessary that I should be a not unskilful critic in another man's profession. [84] In a similar manner I am now, at your request, speaking of the orator, that is, the perfect orator; for, about whatever art or faculty inquiry is made, it always refers to it in its state of absolute perfection; and if, therefore, you now allow me to be a speaker, if even a pretty good one, or a positively good one, I will not contradict you; (for why should I, at my time of life, be so foolish? I know that I am esteemed such;) but, if it be so, I am certainly not perfect. For there is not among mankind any pursuit of greater difficulty or effort, or that requires more aids from learning; [85] but, since I have to speak of the orator, I must of necessity speak of the perfect orator; for unless the powers and nature of a thing be set before the eyes in their utmost perfection, its character and magnitude cannot be understood. Yet I confess, Catulus, that I do not at present live in any great familiarity with the writings or the professors of philosophy, and that, as you have rightly observed, I never had much leisure to set apart for the acquisition of such learning, and that I have only given to study such portions of time as my leisure when I was a youth, and vacations from the business of the forum, have allowed me.    

{23.} [86] L   "But if, Catulus, you ask for my opinion on that learning, I believe that so much time need not be spent on it by a man of ability, and one who studies with a view to the forum, to the senate, to  court cases, to civil administration, as those have chosen to give to it whom life has failed while they were learning. For all arts are handled in one manner by those who apply them to practice; in another by those who, taking delight in treating of the arts themselves, never intend to do anything else during the whole course of their lives. The master of the gladiators ** is now in the extremity of age, yet daily ponders upon the improvement of his science, for he has no other concern; but Quintus Velocius ** had learned that exercise in his youth, and, as he was naturally formed for it, and had thoroughly acquired it, he was, as it is said in Lucilius,

          Though as a gladiator in the school
          Well skilled, and bold enough to match with any,

yet resolved to devote more attention to the duties of the forum, and of friendship, and to his domestic concerns. Valerius ** sang every day; for he was on the stage; what else was he to do? [87] But our friend Numerius Furius sings only when it is agreeable to him; for he is the head of a family, and of equestrian dignity; he learned when a boy as much as it was necessary for him to learn. The case is similar with regard to sciences of the greatest importance; we have seen Quintus Tubero, ** a man of eminent virtue and prudence, engaged in the study of philosophy night and day, but his uncle Africanus ** you could scarcely ever perceive paying any attention to it, though he paid a great deal. Such knowledge is easily gained, if you only get as much of it as is necessary, and have a faithful and able instructor, and know how to learn yourself. [88] But if you are inclined to do nothing else all your life, your very studies and inquiries daily give rise to something for you to investigate as an amusement at your leisure; thus it happens, that the investigation of particular points is endless, though general knowledge is easy, if practice establish learning once acquired, moderate exercise be devoted to it, and memory and inclination continue. But it is pleasant to be constantly learning, if we wish to be thoroughly masters of anything; as if I, for instance, had a desire to play excellently with dice, or had a strong attachment to ball games, though perhaps I should not attain perfection in those games; but others, because they excel in any performance, take a more vehement delight in it than the object requires, such as Titius ** in in ball games, and Brulla with dice. [89] There is no reason, therefore, why any one should dread the extent of the sciences because he perceives old men still learning them; for either they were old men when they first applied to them, or have been detained in the study of them till they became old; or are of more than ordinary stupidity. And the truth in my opinion is, that a man can never learn thoroughly that which he has not been able to learn quickly."    

{24.} [90] L   "Now, now," exclaimed Catulus, "I understand, Crassus, what you say, and readily assent to it; I see that there has been time enough for you, a man of vigour and ability to learn, to acquire a knowledge of what you mention."   "Do you still persist," replied Crassus, "to think that I say what I say of myself, and not of my subject? But, if it be agreeable to you, let us now return to our stated business."   "To me," said Catulus, "it is very agreeable."    

[91] L   "To what end, then," continued Crassus, "does this discourse, drawn out to so great a length, and brought up from such deep sources, tend? The two parts which remain for me, that of adorning language, and contemplating eloquence in general in its highest perfection, one of which requires that we should speak gracefully, the other aptly, have this effect, that eloquence is rendered by their means productive of the utmost delight, made to penetrate effectually into the inmost hearts of the audience, and furnished with all possible variety of matter. [92] But the speech which we use in the forum, adapted for contest, full of acrimony, formed to suit the taste of the vulgar, is poor indeed and beggarly; and, on the other hand, even that which they teach who profess themselves masters of the art of speaking, is not of much more dignity than the common style of the forum. We have need of greater pomp, ** of choice matter collected, imported, and brought together from all parts; such a provision as must be made by you, Caesar, for the next year, ** with such pains as I took in my aedileship, because I did not suppose that I could satisfy such a people as ours with ordinary matters, or those of their own country.    

[93] L   "As for choosing and arranging words, and forming them into proper periods, the art is easy, or, I may say, the mere practice without any art at all. Of matter, the quantity and variety are infinite; and as the Greeks ** were not properly furnished with it, and our youth in consequence almost grew ignorant while they were learning, even Latin teachers of rhetoric, please the gods, have arisen within the last two years; a class of persons whom I had suppressed by my edict, ** when I was censor, not because I was unwilling (as some, I know not who, asserted,) that the abilities of our youth should be improved, but because I did not wish that their understandings should be weakened and their impudence strengthened. [94] For among the Greeks, whatever was their character, I perceived that there was, besides exercise of the tongue, some degree of learning, as well as urbanity suited to liberal knowledge; but I knew that these new masters could teach youth nothing but effrontery, which, even when joined with good qualities, is to be avoided, and, in itself, especially so; and as this, therefore, was the only thing that was taught by the Latins, their school being indeed a school of impudence, I thought it became the censor to take care that the evil should not spread further. [95] I do not, however, determine and decree on the point, as if I despaired that the subjects which we are discussing can be delivered, and treated with elegance, in Latin; for both our language and the nature of things allows the ancient and excellent science of Greece to be adapted to our customs and manners; but for such a work are required men of learning, such as none of our countrymen have been in this department; but if ever such arise, they will be preferable to the Greeks themselves.    

{25.} [96] L   "A speech, then, is to be made becoming in its kind, with a sort of complexion and substance of its own; for that it be weighty, agreeable, savouring of erudition and liberal knowledge, worthy of admiration, polished, having feeling and passion in it, as far as is required, are qualities not confined to particular limbs, but are apparent in the whole body; but that it be, as it were, strewed with flowers of language and thought, is a feature which ought not to be equally diffused throughout the whole speech, but at such intervals, that, as in the arrangement of ornaments, ** there may be certain remarkable and luminous objects disposed here and there. [97] Such a kind of eloquence, therefore, is to be chosen, as is most adapted to interest the audience, such as may not only delight, but delight without surfeit; (for I do not imagine it to be expected of me, that I should admonish you to beware that your language be not poor, or rude, or vulgar, or obsolete: both your age and your geniuses encourage me to something of a higher nature;) [98] for it is difficult to tell what the cause is why, from those objects which most strongly strike our senses with pleasure, and occasion the most violent emotions at their first appearance, we should soonest turn away with a certain loathing, when we are sated. How much more florid, in the gaiety and variety of the colouring, are most objects in modern pictures than in ancient ones; which, however, though they captivate us at first sight, do not afford any lasting pleasure; whereas we are strongly attracted by rough and faded colouring in the paintings of antiquity. How much softer and more delicate are fanciful ** modulations and notes in music, than those which are strict and grave; and yet if the former are often repeated, not only persons of an austere character, but even the multitude, raise an outcry against them. [99] We may perceive, too, in regard to the other senses, that we take a less permanent delight in perfumes composed of the sweetest and most powerful odours, than in those of a more moderate scent; that that is more commended which appears to smell like wax, than that which is as strong as saffron; and that, in the sense of feeling itself, there is a limit required both to softness and smoothness. How soon does even the taste, which of all our senses is the most desirous of gratification, and is delighted with sweetness beyond the others, become nauseous and reject that which is too luscious! Who can take sweet drinks and food long together? while, in both kinds of nutriment, such things as affect the sense with but a slight pleasure are the furthest removed from that satiating quality; [100] and so, in all other things, loathing still borders upon the most exquisite delights; and therefore we should the less wonder at this effect in language, in which we may form a judgment, either from the poets or the orators, that a style elegant, ornate, embellished, and sparkling, without intermission, without restraint, without variety, whether it be prose or poetry, though painted with the brightest colours, cannot possibly give lasting pleasure. And we the sooner take offence at the false locks and paint of the orator or poet, for this reason, that the senses, when affected with too much pleasure, are satiated, not from reason, but instinctively; in writings and in speeches these disguised blemishes are even more readily noticed, not only from the judgment of the ear, but from that of the understanding.    

{26.} [101] L   "Though such expressions of applause, therefore, as 'very well,' 'excellent,' may be often repeated to me, I would not have 'beautifully,' 'pleasantly,' come too often; yet I would have the exclamation 'Nothing can be better,' very frequent. But this high excellence and merit in speaking should be accompanied by some portions of shade and dimness, so that the part on which a stronger light is thrown may seem to stand out, and become more prominent. [102] Roscius never delivers this passage with all the spirit that he can,

          The wise man seeks for honour, not for spoil,
          As the reward of virtue;

but rather in an abject manner, that into the next speech,

          What do I see? the iron-girt soldier holds
          The sacred seats,

he may throw his whole powers, may gaze, may express wonder and astonishment. How does the other great actor ** utter

          What aid shall I solicit?

How gently, how sedately, how calmly! For he proceeds with

          O father! O my country! House of Priam!

in which so much action could not be exerted if it had been consumed and exhausted by any preceding emotion. Nor did the actors discover this before the poets themselves, or, indeed, before even those who composed the music, by both of whom their tone is sometimes lowered, sometimes heightened, sometimes made slender, sometimes full, with variation and distinction. [103] Let our orator, then, be thus graceful and delightful (nor can he indeed be so otherwise); let him have a severe and solid grace, not a luscious and delicious sweetness; for the precepts relative to the ornament of eloquence, which are commonly given, are of such a nature that even the worst speaker can observe them. It is first of all necessary, therefore, as I said before, that a stock of matter and thoughts be got together; a point on which Antonius has already spoken; these are to be interwoven into the very thread and essence of the speech, embellished by words, and diversified by illustrations.    

"But the greatest glory of eloquence is to emphasise a subject by embellishment; which [104] has effect not only in amplifying and extolling anything in a speech to an extraordinary degree, but also in extenuating it, and making it appear contemptible. {27.} This is required on all those points which Antonius said must be observed in order to gain credit to our statements, when we explain anything, or when we conciliate the feelings, or when we excite the passions of our audience; [105] but in the particular that which I mentioned last, amplification is of the greatest effect; and excellence in it is the particular and appropriate praise of the orator. Even that exercise is of more than ordinary importance which Antonius illustrated ** in the latter part of his talk, (in the beginning ** he set it aside,) I mean that of panegyric and satire; for nothing is a better foundation for emphasis and amplification in a speech than the talent of performing both these elements in a most effective manner. [106] Consequently, even those topics are of use which, though they ought to be proper to cases, and to be inherent in their very vitals, yet, as they are commonly applied to general subjects, have been called 'common places' by the ancients; of which some consist in bitter accusations and complaints against vices and crimes, with a certain amplification, (in opposition to which nothing is usually said, or can be said,) as against an embezzler of the public money, or a traitor, or a parricide; remarks which we ought to introduce when the charges have been proved, for otherwise they are dull and trifling; [107] others consist in pleading or commiseration; others relate to contested points of argument, whence you may be enabled to speak fully on either side of any general question, an exercise which is now imagined to be peculiar to those two sects of philosophy ** of which I spoke before; among those of remote antiquity it belonged to those from whom all the art and power of speaking in forensic pleadings was derived; ** for concerning virtue, duty, justice and equity, dignity, utility, honour, ignominy, rewards and punishments, and similar subjects, we ought to possess the spirit, and talent, and address, to speak on either side of the question. [108] But since, being driven from our own possessions, we are left in a poor little farm, and even that the subject of litigation, and since, though the patrons of others, we have not been able to preserve and protect our own property, let us borrow what we need (which is a notable disgrace) from those ** who have made this invasion into our patrimony.    

{28.} [109] L   "Those, then, who take their name from a very small portion ** of Athens and its neighbourhood, and are called Peripatetic or Academic philosophers, but who formerly, on account of their eminent knowledge in important affairs, were by the Greeks called political philosophers, being distinguished by a name relating to all public administration, say that every speech on civil affairs is employed on one or other of these two kinds of questions, either that of a definite controversy limited to certain times and parties; as, 'Whether is it proper that our captives be recovered from the Carthaginians by the restitution of theirs?' or on an indefinite question, inquiring about a subject generally; as, 'What should be determined or considered concerning captives in general?' Of these, they term the former kind a cause or controversy, and limit it to three things, law-suits, deliberations, and panegyric; but the other kind of question, or proposition as it were, the indefinite, is denominated a consultation. ** So far they instruct us. [110] The rhetoricians, however, use this division in their instructions, but not so that they seem to recover a lost possession by right, by a decision in their favour, or by force, but appear, according to the practice of the civil law, to assert their claim to the property by breaking off a branch; ** for they keep possession of that former kind which is restricted to certain times, places, and parties, and that as it were by the hem of the garment; ** for at this present time, under Philo, ** who flourishes, I hear, as chief of the Academy, the knowledge and practice of even these causes is much observed; as to the latter kind, they only mention it in delivering the first principles of the art, and say that it belongs to the orator; but neither explain its powers, nor its nature, nor its parts, nor general headings, so that it would have been better to pass over it entirely, than leave it when it was once attempted; for they are now understood to say nothing about it for lack of anything to say; in the other case, they would have appeared to be silent from judgment.    

{29.} [111] L   "Every subject, then, is similarly prone to ambiguity, concerning which it may be inquired and disputed; whether the discussion relate to consultations on indefinite points, or to those causes which are concerned with civil affairs and contests in the forum; nor is there any that may not be referred either to the nature and principles of knowledge or of action. [112] For either the knowledge itself and acquaintance with any affair is the object of inquiry; as, 'Whether virtue be desirable on account of its own intrinsic worth, or for the sake of some emolument attending it?' or counsel with regard to an act is sought; as, 'Whether a wise man ought to concern himself in the administration of government?' [113] And of knowledge there are three kinds, that which is formed by conjecture, that which admits of certain definition, and that which is (if I may so term it) consequential. For whether there be anything in any other thing, is inquired by conjecture; as, 'Whether there is wisdom in mankind?' But what nature anything has, a definition explains; as if the inquiry be, 'What is wisdom?' And consequential knowledge is the subject treated of, when the question is, 'What peculiarity attends on anything?' as, 'Whether it be the part of a good man to tell a falsehood on any occasion?' [114] But they return again to conjecture, and divide it into four kinds; for the question is either, 'What a thing is,' as, 'Whether law among mankind is from nature or from opinions?' or, 'What the origin of a thing is,' as, 'What is the foundation of civil laws and governments?' or the cause and reason of it; as if it is asked, 'Why do the most learned men differ upon points of the greatest importance?' or as to the possible changes in anything; as if it is disputed, 'Whether virtue can die in men, or whether it can be converted into vice?' [115] With regard to definition, disputes arise, either when the question is, 'What is imprinted, as it were, in the common understanding?' as when it is discussed, 'Whether that be right which is advantageous to the greater number?' or when it is inquired, 'What is the peculiar property of any character?' as, 'Whether to speak elegantly be the particular attribute of the orator, or whether any one else can do so?' or when a thing is distributed into parts; as if the question be, 'How many kinds of desirable things there are?' and, 'Whether there be three, those of the body, those of the mind, and external things?' or when it is described what is the form or, as it were, natural characteristic of any person; as if it be inquired, 'What is the exact representation of an avaricious, a seditious, or a vainglorious man?' [116] Of the consequential, two principal kinds of questions are proposed; for the question is either simple, as if it be disputed, 'Whether glory be desirable?' or comparative, 'Whether praise or wealth is more to be coveted?' But of such simple questions there are three sorts, as to things that are to be desired or avoided; as, 'Whether honours are desirable?'   'Whether poverty is to be avoided?' as to right and wrong; as, 'Whether it be right to revenge injuries, even those of relations?' as to honour and ignominy; as, 'Whether it be honourable to suffer death for the sake of glory?' [117] Of the comparative also there are two sorts: one, when the question is whether things are the same, or there be any difference between them; as between fear and reverence, a king and a tyrant, a flatterer and a friend; the other, when the inquiry is, 'Which of two things is preferable'? as, 'Whether wise men are led by the approval of the most worthy, or by popular applause?' It is this way that the controversies which relate to knowledge are described, for the most part, by men of the greatest learning.    

{30.} [118] L   "But those which relate to action, either concern controversial points of moral duty, under which head it may be inquired, 'What is right and to be practised;' of which head the whole train of virtues and of vices is the subject-matter; or refer to the excitement, or alleviation, or removal of some emotion of the mind. Under this heading are included exhortation, reproof, consolation, compassion, and all that either gives impulse to any emotion of the mind, or, if it so happen, mitigates it. [119] These kinds, then, and modes of all questions being explained, it is of no consequence if the partition of Antonius disagrees in any particular with my division; for there are the same parts in both our discussions, though divided and distributed by me a little differently from him. Now I will proceed to the sequel, and recall myself to my appointed task and business. For the arguments for every kind of question are to be drawn from those common places which Antonius enumerated; but some common places will be more adapted to some kinds than to others; concerning which there is no necessity for me to speak, not because it is a matter of any great length, but because it is sufficiently obvious.    

[120] L   "Those speeches, then, are the most ornate which spread over the widest field, and, from some distinct and single question, apply and direct themselves to show the nature of such questions in general, so that the audience, from understanding its nature, and kind, and whole bearing, may determine as to particular individuals, and as to all disputes, both criminal and civil. [121] Antonius has encouraged you, young men, to persevere in this exercise, and suggested that you were to be conducted by degrees from small and confined questions to all the power and varieties of argument. Such qualifications are not to be gained from a few small treatises, as they have imagined who have written on the art of speaking; nor are they work merely for a Tusculan villa, or for a morning walk and afternoon sitting, such as these of ours; for we have not only to point and fashion the tongue, but have to store the mind with the sweetness, abundance, and variety of most important and numerous subjects.    

{31.} [122] L   "For ours is the possession (if we are indeed orators, if we are to be consulted as persons of authority and leaders in the civil contests and perils of the citizens and in public councils), ours, I say, is the entire possession of all that wisdom and learning, upon which, as if it were vacant and had fallen down to them, men abounding in leisure have seized, taking advantage of us, and either speak of the orator with ridicule and sarcasm, as Socrates in the Gorgias, or write something on the art of oratory in a few little treatises, and call them books on rhetoric; as if all those things did not equally concern the orator, which are taught by the same philosophers on justice, on the duties of life, on the establishment and administration of civil government, and on the whole systems of moral and even natural philosophy. [123] These matters, since we cannot get them elsewhere, we must now borrow from those very persons by whom we have been pillaged; so that we apply them to the knowledge of civil affairs, to which they belong, and have a regard; nor let us (as I observed before) consume all our lives in this kind of learning, but, when we have discovered the springs, (which he who does not find out immediately will never find at all,) let us draw from them as much as occasion may require, as often as we need. [124] For neither does the nature and understanding of man possess such sharp discernment, that any one can perceive things of such importance, without them being pointed out; nor yet is there so much obscurity in the things, that a man of penetrating genius cannot obtain an insight into them, if he only direct his view towards them. As the orator therefore has liberty to expound on such a large and immense field, and, wherever he stops, can stand upon his own territory, all the equipment and embellishments of eloquence readily offer themselves to him. [125] For copiousness of matter produces copiousness of language; and, if there be an inherent dignity in the subjects on which he speaks, there must be, from the nature of the thing, a certain splendour in his expression. If any speaker or writer has been liberally instructed in the learning proper for youth, and has an ardent attachment to study, and is assisted by natural endowments, and exercised in those indefinite questions on general subjects, and has chosen, at the same time, the most elegant writers and speakers to study and imitate, he will never, be assured, need instruction from such teachers on how to compose or embellish his language; so readily, in an abundance of matter, will nature herself, once she is stimulated, find her way without any guide into all the art of adorning eloquence."    

{32.} [126] L   Catulus here observed, "O immortal gods, what an infinite variety, force, and extent of matter you have embraced, Crassus, and from how narrow a circle have you ventured to lead forth the orator, and to place him in the domains of his ancestors! For we have understood that those ancient masters and authors of the art of speaking considered no kind of disputation to be foreign to their profession, but were always exercising themselves in every branch of oratory. [127] Of which number was Hippias of Elis, who, when he came to Olympia, at the time of the vast meeting at the games celebrated every fifth year, boasted, in the hearing of almost all Greece, that there was no subject in any art or science of which he was ignorant; as he understood not only those arts in which all liberal and refined learning is comprised, geometry, music, grammar, and poetry, and whatever is said on the natures of things, the moral duties of men, and the science of government, but that he had himself made, with his own hand, the ring which he wore, and the cloak and shoes which he had on. ** [128] He indeed went a little too far; but, even from his example, we may easily conjecture how much knowledge those very orators desired to gain in the most noble arts, when they did not shrink from learning even the more humble. Why need I allude to Prodicus of Chios, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, or Protagoras of Abdera? every one of whom in those days disputed and wrote much even on the nature of things. [129] Even Gorgias of Leontini himself, under whose advocacy (as Plato represented) the orator yielded to the philosopher; ** who was either never defeated in argument by Socrates, (and then the dialogue of Plato is wholly fictitious,) or, if he was so defeated, it was because Socrates was the more eloquent and convincing, or, as you term it, the more powerful and better orator; but this Gorgias, in that very book of Plato, offers to speak most copiously on any subject whatever, that could be brought under discussion or inquiry; and he was the first of all men who ventured to demand, in a large assembly, on what subject any one desired to hear him speak; and to whom such honours were paid in Greece, that to him alone, of all great men, a statue was erected at Delphi, not gilded, but of solid gold. [130] Those whom I have named, and many other most consummate masters in the art of speaking, flourished at the same time; from whose examples it may be understood, that the truth is really such as you, Crassus, have stated, and that the name of the orator was distinguished among the ancients in Greece in a more extensive sense, and with greater honour than among ourselves. [131] I am therefore the more in doubt whether I should attribute a greater degree of praise to you, or of blame to the Greeks; since you, born under a different language and manners, in the busiest of cities, occupied either with almost all the private cases of the people, or with the government of the world and the direction of the mightiest of empires, have mastered such numbers of subjects, and acquired so extensive a knowledge, and have united all this with the science and practice of one who is of authority in the republic by his counsels and eloquence; whilst they, born in an atmosphere of learning, ardently attached to such studies, but dissolved in idleness, have not only made no acquisitions, but have not even preserved as their own that which was left and consigned to them."    

{33.} [132] L   Crassus then said, "Not only in this particular, Catulus, but in many others, the grandeur of the sciences has been diminished by the division and separation of their parts. Do you imagine, that when the famous Hippocrates of Cos flourished, there were then some of the medical faculty who cured diseases, others wounds, and a third class the eyes? Do you suppose that geometry under Euclid and Archimedes, that music under Damon and Aristoxenus, that grammar itself when Aristophanes and Callimachus treated of it, were so divided into parts, that no one comprehended the universal system of any of those sciences, but different persons selected different parts on which they meant to bestow their labour? [133] I have, indeed, often heard from my father and father-in-law, that even our own countrymen, who were keen to excel in renown for wisdom, used to comprehend all the objects of knowledge which this city had then learned. They mentioned, as an instance of this, Sextus Aelius; and we ourselves have seen Manius Manilius walking across the forum; a signal that as he did so, all the citizens were at liberty to consult him upon any subject; and to such persons, when thus walking or sitting at home upon their ceremonial seats, all people had free access, not only to consult them upon points of civil law, but even upon the settlement of a daughter in marriage, the purchase of an estate, or the cultivation of a farm, and indeed upon any task or business whatsoever. [134] Such was the wisdom of the well-known elder Publius Crassus, such that of Titus Coruncanius, such that of the great-grandfather of Scipio, my son-in-law, a person of great judgment; all of whom were pontifex maximus, so that they were consulted upon all affairs, divine and human; and the same men gave their counsel and discharged their duty in the senate, before the people, and in the private cases of their friends, in civil and military service, both at home and abroad. [135] What was deficient in Marcus Cato, except the modern polish of foreign and imported learning? Did he, because he was versed in the civil law, forbear from pleading cases? or, because he could speak, neglect the study of jurisprudence? He laboured in both these kinds of learning, and succeeded in both. Was he, by the popularity which he acquired by attending to the business of private persons, made slower to act in the public service of the state? No man spoke with more courage before the people, none was ever a better senator; he was at the same time a most excellent commander-in-chief; and indeed nothing in those days could possibly be known or learned in this city which he did not investigate and thoroughly understand, and on which he did not also write. [136] Now, on the contrary, men generally come to assume offices and the duties of public administration unarmed and defenceless; prepared with no science, nor any knowledge of business. But if any one happen to excel the multitude, he is elevated with pride by the possession of any single talent, as military courage, or a little experience in war, (which indeed has now fallen into decay, **) or a knowledge of the law, (not of the whole law, for nobody studies the pontifical law, which is attached to civil jurisprudence, **) or eloquence, (which they imagine to consist in declamation and a torrent of words,) while none have any notion of the alliance and affinity that connects all the liberal arts and sciences, and even the virtues themselves.    

{34.} [137] L   "But to direct my remarks to the Greeks, (whom we cannot omit in a dissertation of this nature; for as examples of virtue are to be sought among our own countrymen, so examples of learning are to be derived from them;) seven are said to have lived at one time, who were esteemed and called wise men. All these men, except Thales of Miletus, governed their respective cities. Whose learning is reported, at the same period, to have been greater, or whose eloquence to have received more ornament from literature, than that of Pisistratus? - who is said to have been the first that arranged the books of Homer as we now have them, when they were previously confused. He was not indeed of any great service to the community, but was eminent for eloquence, and at the same time he excelled in erudition and liberal knowledge. [138] What was the character of Pericles? of whose power in speaking we have heard, that when he spoke for the good of his country against the inclinations of the Athenians, that very severity with which he contradicted the favourites of the people, became popular and agreeable to all men; and the old comic poets declared, (even when they satirised him, as was then lawful to be done at Athens,) that the graces of persuasion dwelt on his lips, and that there was such mighty energy in him that he left, as it were, certain stings in the minds of those who listened to him. Yet no declaimer had taught him to bawl for hours by the water-clock, but, as we hear from tradition, the famous Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, a man eminent in all the most valuable sciences, had instructed him. He, accordingly, excelling as he did in learning, judgment, and eloquence, presided over civil and military affairs at Athens for forty years in total. [139] What was the character of Critias, or of Alcibiades? They were not indeed useful members of the state in which they lived, but were certainly men of learning and eloquence; and were they not improved by conversation with Socrates? Who instructed Dion of Syracuse in every branch of learning? Was it not Plato? The same illustrious philosopher, too, who formed him not to oratory only, but to courage and virtue, impelled, equipped, and armed him to deliver his country. Did Plato, then, instruct Dion in sciences different from those in which Isocrates educated the renowned Timotheus the son of Conon the eminent general, and himself a most excellent commander, and a man of extensive learning? Or from those in which Lysis the Pythagorean trained Epaminondas of Thebes, who perhaps was the most remarkable man of all Greece? Or from those which Xenophon taught Agesilaus, or Archytas of Tarentum Philolaus, or Pythagoras himself all that old province of Italy which was formerly called Magna Graecia? 

{35.} [140] L   I do not imagine that they were different; for I see that one and the same course of study comprised all those branches of knowledge which were esteemed necessary for a man of learning, and one who wished to become eminent in civic administration; and that they who had received this knowledge, if they had sufficient powers for speaking in public, and devoted themselves, without any impediment from nature, to oratory, became distinguished for eloquence. [141] Aristotle himself, accordingly, when he saw Isocrates grow remarkable for the number and quality of his pupils, [because he himself had diverted his lectures from forensic and civil cases to mere elegance of language, **] suddenly changed almost his whole system of teaching, and quoted a verse from the tragedy of Philoctetes ** with a little alteration; for the hero said, that 'It was disgraceful for him to be silent while he allowed barbarians to speak;' but Aristotle said that it was disgraceful for him to be silent while he allowed Isocrates to speak. He therefore adorned and illustrated all philosophical learning, and associated the knowledge of things with practice in speaking. Nor did this escape the knowledge of that very sagacious monarch Philip, who sent for him as a tutor for his son Alexander, so that he might acquire from the same teacher instructions at once in conduct and in language. [142] Now, if any one desires either to call that philosopher, who instructs us fully in things and words, an orator, he may do so without opposition from me; or if he prefer to call that orator, of whom I speak as having wisdom united with eloquence, a philosopher, I shall make no objection, provided it be allowed that neither his inability to speak, who understands his subject but cannot set it forth in words, nor his ignorance, to whom substance is lacking  though words abound, can merit commendation; and if I had to choose one of the two, I should prefer uneloquent good sense to loquacious folly. [143] But if it be inquired which is the more eminent excellence, the palm is to be given to the learned orator; and if they allow the same person to be a philosopher, there is an end to the controversy; but if they think them distinct, they will acknowledge their inferiority in this respect, that all their knowledge is inherent in the complete orator; but in the knowledge of the philosophers eloquence is not necessarily inherent; which, though it may be undervalued by them, must of necessity be thought to give a finishing grace to their sciences." When Crassus had spoken thus, he made a pause for a while, and the rest kept silence.    

{36.} [144] L   Cotta then observed, "I cannot indeed complain, Crassus, that you seem to me to have given a discourse upon a different subject from that on which you had undertaken to speak; for you have contributed to our conversation more than was either imposed upon you by us, or given notice of by yourself. But certainly it was the part that belonged to you, to speak about the embellishments of language, and you had already entered upon it, and divided the whole excellence of eloquence into four parts; and, when you had spoken upon the first two, as we indeed thought sufficiently, but, as you said yourself, cursorily and slightly, you had two others left: how we should speak, first, elegantly, and next, aptly. [145] But when you were proceeding to these particulars, the tide, as it were, of your genius suddenly hurried you to a distance from land, and carried you out into the deep, almost beyond the view of us all; for, embracing all knowledge of everything, you did not indeed teach it us, (for that was impossible in so short a space of time,) but, I know not what improvement you may have made in the rest of the company, as for myself, you have carried me altogether into the heart of the academy, in regard to which I could wish that that were true which you have often asserted, that it is not necessary to consume our lives in it, but that he may see everything in it who only turns his eyes towards it: but even if the view be somewhat obscure, or I should be extraordinarily dull, I shall assuredly never rest, or yield to fatigue, until I understand their dubious ways and arts of disputing for and against every question." [146] Caesar then said, "One thing in your remarks, Crassus, struck me very much, that you said that he who did not learn anything quickly, could never thoroughly learn it at all; so that I can have no difficulty in making an attempt, and either immediately understanding what you extolled to the skies in your observations, or, if I cannot do so, losing no time, as I may remain content with what I have already acquired." [147] Here Sulpicius observed, "I, indeed, Crassus, neither desire any acquaintance with your Aristotle, nor Carneades, nor any of the philosophers; you may either imagine that I despair of being able to acquire their knowledge, or that, as is really the case, I despise it. The ordinary knowledge of common affairs, and such as come to trial in the forum, is great enough for me, for attaining that degree of eloquence which is my object; and even in that narrow circle of expertise I am ignorant of a multitude of things, which I begin to study, whenever any case in which I am to speak requires them. If, therefore, you are not now weary, and if we are not troublesome to you, revert to those matters which contribute to the merit and splendour of language; particulars which I desired to hear from you, not to make me despair that I can ever possibly attain eloquence, but to make some addition to my stock of learning."

{37.} [148] L   "You require of me," said Crassus, "to speak on matters which are very well known, and with which you, Sulpicius, are not unacquainted; for what rhetorician has not treated of this subject, has not given instructions on it, has not even left something about it in writing? But I will comply with your request, and briefly explain to you at least such points as are known to me; but I shall still think that you ought to refer to those who are the authors and inventors of these intricate rules. [149] All speech, then, is formed of words, which we must first consider singly, then in composition; for there is one merit of language which lies in single words, another which is produced by words joined and compounded. We shall therefore either use such words as are the proper and fixed names as it were of things, and apparently almost born at the same time with the things themselves; or such as are metaphorical, and placed as it were in a situation foreign to them; or such as we invent and make ourselves. [150] In regard then to words taken in their own proper sense, it is a merit in the orator to avoid mean and obsolete ones, and to use such as are choice and ornamental; such as have in them some fullness and force of sound. But in this kind of proper words, selection is necessary, which must be decided in some measure by the judgment of the ear; in which point the mere habit of speaking well is of great effect. [151] Even what is commonly said of orators by the illiterate multitude, 'He uses proper words,' or 'Such a one uses improper words,' is not the result of any acquired skill, but is a judgment arising from a natural sense of what is right; in which respect it is no great merit to avoid a fault, (though it is of great importance to do so,) yet this is the groundwork, as it were and foundation of the whole, namely, the use and command of proper words. [152] But the superstructure which the orator himself is to raise upon this, and in which he is to display his art, appears to be a matter for us to examine and illustrate.    

{38.} "There are three qualities, then, in a simple word, which the orator may employ to illustrate and adorn his language; he may choose either an unusual word, or one that is new or metaphorical. [153] Unusual words are generally of ancient date and fashion, and such as have been long out of use in daily conversation; these are allowed more freely to poetical licence than to ours; yet a poetical word gives occasionally dignity also to oratory; nor would I shrink from saying, with Coelius, Qua tempestate Poenus in Italiam venit , 'At the season when the Carthaginian came into Italy:' nor proles, 'progeny;' nor suboles, 'offspring;' nor effari, 'to utter;' nor nuncupari, 'to declare;' nor, as you are in the habit of saying, Catulus, non rebar, 'I did not deem;' nor non opinabar, 'I did not opine;' nor many others, from which, if properly introduced, a speech assumes an air of greater grandeur. [154] New words are such as are produced and formed by the speaker; either by joining words together, as these.

           Tum pavor sapientiam omnem mi exanimato expectorat,
           'Then fear expels all wisdom from the breast
          Of me astonished;'

or,

           Num non vis huius me versutiloquas malitias?
          Would you not have me dread his cunning malice?'

for you see that versutiloquas and expectorat are words not newly produced, but merely formed by composition. But words are often invented, without composition, as the expression of Ennius, ** Dii genitales, 'the genial gods; 'or baccarum ubertate incurviscere, 'to bend down with the fertile crop of berries.'    

[155] L   "The third mode, that of using words in a metaphorical sense, is widely prevalent, a mode of which necessity was the parent, compelled by the sterility and narrowness of language; but afterwards delight and pleasure made it frequent; for as a dress was first adopted for the sake of keeping off the cold, but in process of time began to be made an ornament of the body, and an emblem of dignity, so the metaphorical use of words was originally invented on account of their paucity, but became common from the delight which it afforded. For even the countrymen say, gemmare vites, that 'the vines are budding;' luxuriem esse in herbis, that 'there is a luxuriance in the grass;' and laetas segetes, that 'there is a bountiful crop;' for when that which can scarcely be indicated by its proper word is expressed by one used in a metaphorical sense, the similitude taken from that which we indicate by a foreign term gives clearness to that which we wish to be understood. [156] These metaphors, therefore, are a type of borrowing, as you take from something else that which you have not of your own. Those have a greater degree of boldness which do not show poverty, but bring some accession of splendour to our language. But why should I specify to you either the modes of their production or their various kinds?    

{39.} [157] L   "A metaphor is a brief similitude contracted into a single word; which word being put in the place of another, as if it were in its own place, conveys, if the resemblance be acknowledged, delight; if there is no resemblance, it is condemned. But such words should be metaphorically used as may make the subject clearer; as all these: **

                              Inhorrescit mare,
          Tenebrce conduplicantur, noctisque et nimbum occaecat nigror,
          Flamma inter nubes coruscat, caelum tonitru contremit,
          Grando mixta imbri largifluo subita pracipitans cadit;
          Undique omnes venti erumpunt, saevi existunt turbines;
          Fervit aestu pelagus.


                               'The sea begins to shudder,
          Darkness is doubled; and the black of night
          And of the tempest thickens; fire gleams vivid
          Amid the clouds; the heavens with thunder shake;
          Hail mixed with copious rain sudden descends
          Precipitate; from all sides every blast
          Breaks forth; fierce whirlwinds gather, and the flood
          Boils with fresh tumult.'    

Here almost everything is expressed in words metaphorically adapted from something similar, that the description may be heightened. [158] Or metaphors are employed that the whole nature of any action or design may be more significantly expressed; as in the case of him who indicates, by two metaphorical words, that another person was designedly obscure, in order that what he intended might not be understood,

          Quandoquidem is se circumvestit dictis, saepit sedulo,
           'Since thus he clothes himself around with words,
          And hedges constantly.'    

"Sometimes, also, brevity is the object attained by metaphor; as, Si telum manu fugit, 'If from his hand the javelin fled.' The throwing of a missile weapon unawares could not be described with more brevity in the proper words than it is signified by one used metaphorically. [159] On this subject, it often appears to me wonderful why all men are more delighted with words used in a metaphorical or foreign sense than in their own proper and natural signification. {40.} For if a thing has not a name of its own, and a term peculiar to it, as the pes, or 'hawser,' in a ship; nexum, a 'bond,' which is a ceremony performed with scales; ** divortium , a 'divorce,' with reference to a wife, ** necessity compels you to borrow from another what you have not yourself; but, even in the greatest abundance of proper words, men are much more charmed with such as are uncommon, if they are used metaphorically with judgment. [160] This happens, I imagine, either because it is some manifestation of wit to jump over such expressions as lie before you, and catch at others from a greater distance; or because he who listens is led another way in thought, and yet does not wander from the subject, which is a very great pleasure; or because a subject, and entire comparison, is despatched in a single word; or because every metaphor that is adopted with judgment is directed immediately to our senses, and principally to the sense of sight, which is the keenest of them all. [161] For such expressions as the odour of urbanity, the softness of humanity, the murmur of the sea, and sweetness of language, are derived from the other senses; but those which relate to the sight are much more striking, for they place almost in the eye of the mind such objects as we cannot see and discern by the natural eyes. There is, indeed, nothing in universal nature, the proper name and term of which we may not use with regard to other matters; for from wherever a simile may be drawn (and it may be drawn from anything), from there a single word, which contains the resemblance, metaphorically applied, may give illustration to our language. [162] In such metaphorical expressions, dissimilitude is principally to be avoided; as,

           Caeli ingentes fornices,
           'The arch immense of heaven;'

for though Ennius ** is said to have brought a globe upon the stage, yet the appearance of an arch can never be inherent in the form of a globe.

             Vive, Ulixes, dum licet:
          Oculis postremum lumen radiatum rape.
**
           'Live, live, Ulysses, while you may, and snatch,
          Snatch with thine eyes the last light shining on them.'

He did not say, cape, 'take,' nor pete, 'seek.' for such expressions might have implied delay, as of one hoping to live longer; but rape, 'snatch,' a word which was peculiarly suitable to what he had said before, dum licet, 'while you may.'    

{41.} [163] L   "Care should next be taken that the simile be not too far-fetched; as, for 'the Syrtis of his patrimony,' I should rather have said, 'the rock;' for 'the Charybdis of his possessions,' rather 'the gulf:' for the eyes of the mind are more easily directed to those objects which we have seen, than to those of which we have only heard. And since it is the greatest merit in a metaphorical word, that what is metaphorical should strike the senses, all offensiveness is to be avoided in those objects to which the comparison must naturally draw the minds of the audience. [164] I would not have it said that the republic was 'castrated' by the death of Africanus; I would not have Glaucia called 'the excrement of the senate;' for though there may be a resemblance, yet it is a depraved imagination in both cases that gives rise to such a comparison. I would not have the metaphor grander than the subject requires, as 'a tempest of revelling;' nor meaner, as 'the revelling of the tempest.' I would not have the metaphorical term be of a more confined sense than the proper and peculiar term would have been; as,

           Quidnam est, obsecro, quid te adiri abnutas? **
           'Why is it, pray, that you nod us back
          From coming to you?'

Vetas, prohibes, absterres, 'forbid,' 'hinder,' 'terrify,' would have been better, because he had before said,

                                        Fly quickly hence, **
          Lest my contagion or my shadow fall
          On men of worth.    

[165] L   "Also, if you perceive that the metaphor may appear too harsh, it may frequently be softened by prefixing a word or words to it; as if, in old times, on the death of Marcus Cato, any one had said that the senate was left 'an orphan,' the expression would have been rather bold; but, 'so to speak, an orphan,' is somewhat milder; for a metaphor ought not to be too daring, but of such a nature that it may appear to have been introduced into the place of another expression, not to have sprung into it; to have come in by entreaty, and not by violence. [166] And there is no mode of embellishment more effective as regards single words, nor any that throws a greater lustre upon language; for the ornament that flows from this figure does not consist merely in a single metaphorical word, but may be connected by a continuation of many, so that one thing may be expressed and another understood; as,

                              Nor will I allow
          Myself again to strike the  fleet of Greeks
          On the same rock and instrument of ruin. **

And this,

          You err, you err, for the strong reins of law
          Shall hold you back, exulting and confiding
          Too much in your own self, and make you bow
          Beneath the yoke of empire.

Something being assumed as similar, the words which are proper to it are metaphorically transferred (as I termed it before) to another subject.    

{42.} [167] L   "This is a great ornament to language, but obscurity is to be avoided in it; for from this figure arise what are called enigmas. Nor is this rule to be observed in single words only, but in phrases, that is, in a continuation of words. Nor have metonymy and hypallage ** their form from a single word, but from a phrase or sentence; as,

          Grim Afric trembles with an awful tumult; **

where for the Africans is used Afric; not a word newly impounded, as in Mare saxifragis undis, 'The sea with its rock-breaking waves;' nor a metaphorical one, as, Mollitur mare, 'The sea is softened;' but one proper name exchanged for another, for the sake of embellishment. Thus, 'Cease, Rome, thy foes to cherish,' and, 'The spacious plains are witnesses.' This figure contributes exceedingly to the ornament of style, and is frequently to be used; of which kind of expression these are examples: that the Mars, or fortune, of war is common; and to say Ceres, for corn; Bacchus, for wine; Neptune, for the sea; the curia, or house, for the senate; the campus, for the comitia or elections; the toga, for peace; arms or weapons for war. [168] Under this figure, the virtues and vices are used for the persons in whom they are inherent: 'Luxury has broken into that house;' or, 'where avarice has penetrated;' or, 'honesty has prevailed;' or, 'justice has triumphed.' You perceive the whole force of this kind of figure, when, by the variation or change of a word, a thing is expressed more elegantly; and to this figure is closely allied another, ** which, though less ornamental, ought not to be unknown; as when we would have the whole of a thing understood from a part; as we say walls or roof for a whole building; or a part from the whole, as when we call one troop the cavalry of the Roman people; or when we signify the plural by the singular, as,

          But still the Roman, though the affair has been
          Conducted well, is anxious in his heart; **

or when the singular is understood from the plural,

          We that were Rudians once are Romans now;

or in whatever way, by this figure, the sense is to be understood, not as it is expressed, but as it is meant.   

{43.} [169] L   "We often also use one word in a non-literal sense for another, not with that elegance, indeed, which there is in a metaphor; but, though this is done licentiously, it is sometimes done inoffensively; as when we say a great speech for a long one, a minute soul for a little one.    

"But have you perceived that those elegances which arise from the connection of several metaphors, do not, as I observed, ** lie in one word, but in a series of words? But all those modes of expression which, I said, lay in the change of a word, or are to be understood differently from what is expressed, are in some measure metaphorical. [170] Hence it happens, that all the virtue and merit of single words consists in three particulars: if a word be antique, but such, however, as usage will tolerate; if it be formed by composition, or newly invented, where regard is to be paid to the judgment of the ear and to custom; or if it be used metaphorically; peculiarities which eminently distinguish and brighten language, as with so many stars.    

Following sections (171-230)



FOOTNOTES

  

(1)   See note on ii. 80. 

(2)   This name was introduced on the conjecture of Victorias. Previously the passage was unintelligible. 

(3)   Of Valerius and Furius nothing is known. Ellendt. 

(4)   Cic. Tusc. Quaest. iv. 2; Fin. iv. 9. 

(5)   See ii. 37. 

(6)   Titius is mentioned ii. 62. Of Brulla nothing is known. Ellendt. 

(7)   Apparatu. In allusion, says Petavius, to the shows given by the aediles. 

(8)   Ad annum. That of his aedileship. Ernesti. 

(9)   The Greek rhetoricians. Pearce. 

(10)   Quintilian refers to this passage, ii. 4. 42 . . . The edict of the censors Crassus and Ahenobarbus, which was marked by all the ancient severity, is preserved in Aul. Gell. xv. 11; and Suetonius, De Clar. Rhet. proeem. Crassus intimates that that class of men sprung up again after his edict; for the censors had not such power that their mere prohibitions could continue in force after their term of office was expired. Ellendt. 

(11)   In ornatu. The arrangement of such ornaments as were displayed at games and festivals. 

(12)   Falsae. Fractae et molliores. Ernesti. 

(13)   Aesopus, as I suppose. Ellendt; who observes that the verses are from the Andromache of Ennius. See c. 47, 58; Tusc. Disp. iii. 19. 

(14)   B. ii. c. 84. 

(15)   B ii. c. 10. 

(16)   The Academic and Peripatetic; see iii. 17, 18. Proust. 

(17)   Those who taught forensic eloquence. Proust. 

(18)   The philosophers. 

(19)   From the Academy, and the gymnasia in the suburbs of Athens. Ellendt. 

(20)   Consultatio. See Cic. Part. Orat. i. 18, 20. 

(21)   A ceremony by which a claim to a possession was made. See Gaius, iv. 17. 

(22)   Lacinia. Like persons who scarcely keep their hold of a thing. Ellendt. 

(23)   Philo of Larissa, called by some the founder of a fourth Academy, was a hearer of Clitomachus, Acad. ii. 6. He fled to Rome, with many of the chief men of Athens, in the Mithridatic war, when Cicero, then a young man, attended diligently to his instructions. Brut. 89; Plut. Cic. c. 3. He sometimes gave instructions in rhetoric, sometimes in philosophy, as appears from Tusc. Disp. ii. 3. Henrichsen. 

(24)   See Plato, Hipp. Min. p. 231 G. 

(25)   Gorgias, in the Dialogue of Plato, undertakes the defence of oratory against Socrates, whom Plato represents as maintaining the dignity of philosophy. Gorgias is vanquished by Socrates. Proust. 

(26)   For, except Metellus Numidicus and Marius, no one in those days had gained any great reputation by his conduct in the field. 

(27)   Quod est coniunctum. That is, 'conjunctum cum iure civili.' Proust. What Cicero says here is somewhat at variance with what he says, DeLegg. ii. 19, where he shows, at some length, that only a small part of the civil law is necessary to be combined with the knowledge of the pontifical law. Ellendt. 

(28)   The words in brackets, says Ellendt, are certainly spurious, for they could not possibly have been written by Cicero. In the original, quod ipse, etc., ipse necessarily refers to Aristotle, of whom what is here said could never have been true. 

(29)   The Philoctetes of Euripides, as is generally supposed. 

(30)   All the editions retain ille senius, though universally acknowledged to be corrupt. The conjecture of Turnebus, ille Ennius, has found most favour; that of Orellius, illud Ennii, is approved by Ellendt. That the words di genitales were used by Ennius appears from Servius on Virg Aen . vi. 764. 

(31)   From Pacuvius. See Cic. Divin. i. 14. 

(32)   See Smith's Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant., art. Nexum. 

(33)   Divortium, in its proper sense, denoted the separation of roads or waters. 

(34)   In his tragedy of Hecuba, as is supposed by Hermann, ad Eurip. Hec. p. 167. See Varro, L. L. v. p. 8. 

(35)   Supposed by Bothe, Trag. Lat. Fragm. p. 278, to be from the Niptra of Pacuvius. See Cic. Quaest. Acad. ii. 28. 

(36)   From the Thyestes of Ennius. Cic. Tusc. iii. 12. 

(37)   Orellius's text has istim, which is considered to be the same as istinc. See Victorius ad Cic. Ep. ad Div. vi. 6. 

(38)   Whence this and the following quotation are taken is uncertain. 

(39)   Traductio atque immutatio. See Cic. Orat. 27; Quint, viii. 6. ix. 3; infra, c. 43, 54. 

(40)   From the Annals of Ennius. See Cic. Ep. ad Div. ix. 7; Orat. 27 Festus v. metonymia. 

(41)   Synecdoche

(42)   This quotation and the following are from the Annals of Ennius. 

(43)   C.41. 



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