This is the first part of a long decree, the end of which was already known from another copy ( translated at GEI 36B ). The relationship between the two parts has been discussed by P. Hamon, "Kymè d’Éolide, cité libre et démocratique, et le pouvoir des stratèges" ( Chiron 38, 2008). It remains unclear why the decree needed the detailed financial provisions that are contained in the second part.
The Greek text and Hamon’s French translation can be found online in a thesis by C. Petrazoller, "La stasis dans les cités grecques du IVe au Ier siècle avant J.-C.", pp. 189-194 ( PDF ). The requirement stated prominently in this first part - for the strategoi to hand over a democratic government to their successors (line 13) - is echoed in a decree of Erythrai ( Syll_442 ).
[It was resolved by] the council, as proposed by Euhippos son of Laonikos: in order that the city may be [kept] safe [and free], the strategos in office for the month . . . full assembly and put forth . . . [the recommendation] of the council: in order that the city may be kept free and autonomous [and democratically governed], as is traditional for us . . . piety towards the gods and . . . of freedom as we consult . . . to be for a good outcome . . . Good Fortune coming to our aid, with the goodwill of [the other] gods, 10 who gave oracles . . . to be things acceptable to the gods; it is resolved by the people, that [if any of the men], who are elected to be its strategoi [and commanders of the guard], does not hand over the city, still democratically governed, to his successors; or if he surrenders the keys to those who are subverting the government of the people; [or if he abandons] the office of strategos, yielding to those who are attacking the city . . . or if he acts like a coward or leaves the ranks or does not come to the aid of [the democracy], each of them striving to preserve the city; or if he allows anyone to propose that the city should be made subject [to someone and] should accept a garrison, or that the keys should be surrendered [to those who are attempting] to subvert the democracy, 20 and he does not arrest the person making such a proposal, [when he is] able to; or if he does not report to the people anyone who [is attempting such things]; or if he violates any of the [rules written] in this decree; [then he shall be liable to prosecution] for treason and subversion of the government of the people . . . and an impeachment [can be brought] against him, [for violation of the laws] concerning these matters and of [this] decree . . .
Attalus' home page | 01.07.21 | Any comments?